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Abstract 
There is an ongoing investigation by scholars of ethics and economics into whether 
human decision making and the resultant acts should be guided by rules and proce-
dures or by judgment and discretion. Although each of these modes offers ad-
vantages and disadvantages to decision makers, they are by no means neutral in 
their effect on professional development. The paper presents an in-depth view of 
discretionary decisions using an Aristotelian-Thomistic framework.  
This is the first of the series of papers which focus on the application of realistic 
philosophical principles to ethical professional behaviour and decision making in 
daily practice. Results indicate that classical philosophical theories which use vir-
tues and truth as indispensable components still may give rise to desirable and moral 
conduct among individuals who apply them. 
Keywords: personalistic professionalism in engineering ethics, discretion, 
Christian personalism, human decision making, truth 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of discretion has proliferated so far in the economic, ethical and man-
agerial literature, which offered a series of valuable insights into various aspects 
and instances of professional business and vocational behavior and decision mak-
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ing. The applicability of this discretion capability has ranged from managerial, ju-
dicial and accounting practice, nursing and engineering, to service plants with high-
contact management of service encounters. It is noticeable that the engineering eth-
ics literature has devoted relatively limited space to this concept in comparison with 
other professions, although it appears to be important to professional behavior in 
terms of the use and application of professional discretion. 
2. Discretion defined 
Discretion is an important capability for professional vocations. In fact, it is consid-
ered one of the hallmarks of professionalism. Fleddermann ascribes the following 
attributes to any profession:1 
(1) ‘The work requires sophisticated skills, the use of judgment, d iscret ion, 
and cannot be mechanized, 
(2) membership requires extensive formal education, rather than mere ap-
prenticeship or training; 
(3) specific public control over the professional members through societies, 
which set and enforce standards i.a. for admission to the profession, 
(4) significant public good results from the practice of the profession.’ 
Harris, Pritchard and Rabins mention similar characteristics of professional-
ism, albeit they indirectly indicate discretion as one of the key features.2 Profession-
als may exercise a large degree of individual judgment and creativity in carrying 
out professional responsibilities. The justification for this autonomy in the work-
place is sufficient knowledge to determine the appropriate professional services in 
a given situation. This clearly indicates that, in both cases, the authors consider dis-
cretion to be a capability indispensable to professionalism. 
To grasp the content of this term we must refer to its Latin source: discerno, 
which denotes: (1) ‘the ability to separate, mark off,’ (2) ‘to distinguish with the 
mind or senses, or to show difference’ and (3) ‘to settle or decide’ (a dispute etc.).3 
We can find the same meanings in thesauri and dictionaries of the English language, 
e.g. in Merriam-Webster. The term discretion conveys the sense of discernment, i.e. 
(1) ‘the act or faculty of discerning, discriminating, or judging,’ but also the two 
remaining semantic fields: (2) ‘power of decision, individual judgment,’ (3) ‘power 
of free decision or choice within certain legal bounds’ (e.g. of a judge, doctor, en-
gineer). It also specifies additional two meanings: (4) ‘an ability to make decisions 
which  represent  a responsible choice  and for which  an understanding  of what is  
                                                          
1 Ch. Fleddermann, Engineering ethics, 3rd edition, Pearson – Prentice Hall, 2008, pp. 18–19. 
2 They explain it: (1) extensive training, (2) vital knowledge and skills, (3) control of services, (4) auton-
omy in the workplace, (5) claim to ethical regulation. Ch.E. Harris Jr., M.S. Pritchard, M.J. Rabins, En-
gineering Ethics: Concepts & Cases, Wadsworth, Cenage Learning, 2009, pp. 2–3. 
3 Oxford Latin Dictionary (1968), pp. 549–551. 
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lawful, right, or wise may be presupposed’ (e.g. the age, level of discretion, i.e. 
maturity), and (5) ‘the quality of being discreet, able to maintain a secret, and cau-
tious reserve especially in speech’.4 
All of these notions are crucial to the right performance of professional duties 
and moral obligations. We can also observe the dependence of the profession’s eth-
ical practice on the prerequisites which characterize it in the above definition. Spe-
cifically, the interesting link under consideration is the relationship of discretion to 
vocational practice. 
3. Christian views of human discretion and its operation 
The power of making right choices depends on a number of prerequisites. The proper 
execution of one’s own discretion in any sphere is interconnected with other psycho-
logical capabilities of the human soul. First, it is based on prudence, as it is understood 
as discernment, i.e. ‘the act or faculty of discerning, discriminating, or judging’ and 
reticence (restraint in speaking or communicating),5 since ‘prudence is merely a cer-
tain rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters’.6 
Second, discretion uses virtues, above all, prudence: the wisdom shown in the 
exercise of reason,7 forethought, self-control, and the sagacity or shrewdness in the 
management of affairs. Prudence is exemplified by instances of skillful selection, ad-
aptation, and use of means to a desired end. Aquinas discerns three types of prudence: 
false, imperfect and the perfect.8 Whereas the first is named only metaphorically, as it 
does not take for its end good, but its likeness or the evil itself,9 the second one is 
called imperfect for it perfects only special business skills, like thrift, brinkmanship 
or trade. The third type is perfect as it perfects counsel, judgment, and command in 
view of the end of the whole of human life. 
Third, discretion also operates with conscience, which is the ability of the intel-
lect ‘to witness, to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke.’10 In all of 
these functions, conscience ‘follows the actual application of knowledge to what we 
do,’11 and applies this knowledge to an individual case. Therefore, a person must al-
ready have at hand both valid knowledge and general ethical norms to be able to aptly 
exercise conscience and arrive at a discretionary decision. The knowledge of rules 
                                                          
4 Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2000). 
5 Ibidem. 
6 T. Aquinas, Summa theologica, literally transl. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Burns 
Oates & Washbourne, Benziger Brothers, New York, Cincinnati, Chicago 1922, Ia IIae, q. 61 a. 4; q. 65 
a. 1. 
7 Ibidem. 
8 Ibidem, IIa IIae, q. 47 a. 13. 
9 Sometimes used in metaphors containing antinomic connotations, e.g.: a prudent thief, virtuous liar, 
thrifty neglector, magnanimous abductor. 
10 T. Aquinas, Summa…, Ia Iae, q. 79. a. 13. 
11 Ibidem. 
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according to which the intellect witnesses, binds, incites, accuses, torments or re-
bukes operates most often intuitively, habituously, without any explicitly rational 
or discursive reasoning, although reason is necessary to arrive at the knowledge of 
rules. This multiple form of acting conscience, judging from natural principles, was 
called synderesis by St. Thomas, and the ability to apply this habit to a particular 
situation is syneidesis. 
So long as the intellect is able to apply this true knowledge of the rules, the con-
science operates correctly and validly. Then the discretion given to a person can yield 
the right result: to do good and to avoid evil choices and acts. But how does a person 
know that his knowledge of the rules is true? Here another, fourth, indispensable com-
ponent comes into play: truth. The power of discretion12 is conditioned by the attain-
ment of the truth. 
Aristotle claims that there are five states of the soul in which the truth can be 
grasped ‘by affirmation or denial’, namely: skill, scientific knowledge, practical wis-
dom, wisdom, and intellect.13 Skill is concerned with production rather than action 
(i.e. with instrumental activities rather than ends-in-themselves), while scientific 
knowledge grasps the necessary and eternal truths, such as mathemathics. Wisdom is 
the good in itself and concerns the acquisition of the most honorable i.e. philosophy. 
Intellect relates to practical wisdom and the non-demonstrable first principles. Practi-
cal wisdom – the embodiment of ‘practical truth’, is independent of what we think. 
This requires experience, time and consists both of the ability to see, to understand, 
and to give orders. Practical wisdom requires a virtuous person to apply the general 
knowledge and wisdom to the given circumstances.14 
Although Aristotle did not explicitly mention the discretion among the virtues, 
Aquinas did explain how it operates. 
Aquinas states that truth remains mainly in the intellect, and is defined by the 
conformity of intellect and the thing.15 To uncover the conformity means to learn the 
truth. Truth is the object of the intellect and is related to it just as good is related to 
will. The difference, however, is that good is desired by will,16 whereas the truth is 
directly related to intellect. The notion of good adds the desirability to the truth which 
                                                          
12 To be precise, operating conscience is an act, not a power or potentiality, for it implies a relation of 
knowledge to something, cf. T. Aquinas, Summa…, Ia IIae, q. 79, a. 13.  
Therefore, discretion insofar as it denotes discernment is also an act. Aquinas makes there a res-
ervation however, that conscience sometimes denotes the principle of an act, i.e. the natural habit – syn-
deresis – the ‘natural power of judgment’ (ibidem). 
13 Prof. Gromska interprets these categories as follows: ‘sprawność techniczna (τέχνη), wiedza naukowa 
(έπιστήμη), rozsądek, czyli mądrość praktyczna (φρόνησιζ), mądrość teoretyczna, czyli filozoficzna 
(σοφία) i myślenie intuicyjne (νοῦζ).’ Cf. Arystoteles, Etyka nikomachejska, przekład, wstęp i komentarz, 
D. Gromska, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2007, VI.3 1139b with footnotes Nos. 16 and 17. 
14 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, transl. and ed. by Roger Crisp, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 
p. XXV. 
15 T. Aquinas, Summa…, Ia, q. 16, a. 2. 
16 By the so called the appetitive part of the soul, cf. ibidem. 
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is prior to good. Hence the intellect knows truth by reasoning, and arrives at it by 
composing and dividing.17 
Eventually, discretion is an act which, if practiced well and long enough, can 
be turned into a good habit. Aristotle uses here the term ἓξις and Aquinas uses the 
synonymous term habitus, which means ‘good state of being, condition, demeanor, 
manner, attitude, dress, constitution, or character.’18 For Aristotle, good habit, alter-
natively called ‘permanent disposition’,19 is acquired in the process of habituation.20 
Habitus is then a matter of getting it right within particular spheres of human life. 
Habituated ability becomes a virtue.21 The virtuous person is able to get it right in 
each sphere without guidance from others, and his capacity to do that is what gen-
erally constitutes practical wisdom. Discretion, on the conditions stated above, 
should enable one to decide, judge, discern and generally behave virtuously and 
rightly on one’s own, without any reference to or guidance by rules or laws. Habitus 
can be called virtue in one or two of the following meanings: first, it gives the power 
to act well (potentially), and secondly, that with this power there is also the correct 
use of the power. Only intellect, but not will, is perfected by speculative intellectual 
habits. Virtues therefore can be called virtues only in the first sense, because they 
do not provide a good use of power or habit. They are not, therefore, virtues in the 
second sense. But virtues which perfect the will, such as charity, hope, justice, or 
prudence, cause one to use these speculative habits well. 
Aquinas maintains that there are three speculative intellectual virtues. Self-ev-
ident truth, in other words principle, means that both mind and its virtues are per-
fecting the intelligence to the contemplation of such a principle. This resulting vir-
tue is called intellectus. Truth may also be learned indirectly in the course of a se-
lected research method – this virtue is called science – scientia. The third virtue is 
the ultimate end in all human thought: the wisdom (sapientia). The fourth intellec-
tual virtue may be art, which gives the power to produce good work. Art may be 
called an operative rather than a speculative virtue, however, it does not guarantee 
the good use of the work.22 
Prudence, which we earlier determined to be the source of good discretion, is 
classified as an intellectual operative virtue.23 It gives both the power to do good 
work, and to make good use of things already done. Prudence assumes that a man 
should be well predisposed towards the ends at which he aims and have good mo-
tives. Thus it is indispensable for human welfare, health and good life. It is not only 
the human action toward the due end, which must be good but also the means for 
doing so must be good, i.e. the motives, desires and dispositions of the will of the 
                                                          
17 B. Bonjoannes, Compendium of the Summa Theologica. Pars Prima, transl. into English by Fr. Wilfrid 
Lescher O.P., with Introduction and an Appendix Explanatory of Scholastic Terms by Fr. Carlo Falcini, 
Benziger Bros, New York 1906, p. 47. 
18 Oxford Latin Dictionary, pp. 782-783. 
19 Cf. Arystoteles, Etyka…, translator’s introduction, p. 60 seqq. 
20 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.1, 1103b; II.2, 1104a. 
21 Ibidem, II. 5, 1106a, II.6 1106b. 
22 Ibidem, Ia IIae, q. 57. 
23 J.J. Elmendorf, Elements of Moral Theology Based on the Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, 
James Pott & Co., New York 1892, p. 65. 
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person involved. Also, the right choice of reason should not be moved by an impulse 
of, especially bad will, passion or a fad. 
For a man to act well both reason must be characterized by a habit of intellec-
tual virtue, and the will and desires must also be characterized by a habit of moral 
virtue. Virtues like wisdom, science and art are insufficient conditions for moral 
virtue, but spiritual understanding (intellectus) and prudence are indispensable for 
it. Moral virtue is a habit by which moral (i.e. good) choices are made. To achieve 
the good choice, the will must seek a good which accords with reason as its due end, 
and the means for attaining this good must also be good. This requires right reason 
prudentially deliberating, considering, judging and commanding. Therefore, moral 
virtues cannot exist without prudence, nor without the spiritual understanding.24 
As we have seen from the above, the proper operation of discretion requires 
a number of components which only when taken together, give the desired result: 
correct, valid and morally valuable decisions and the acts of an acting person. The 
whole person, not just reason, must be involved in the act. It is equally important 
for such a person to attain the requisite level of discretion, sometimes combined 
with age (age of discretion).25 We can speak of differentiated levels of discretion 
dependent on personal closeness to the truth in a given sphere. In this sense, for 
example, an experienced civil engineer will have a higher level of discretion in civil 
design than a surgeon, whereas the latter will have it in conducting surgical opera-
tions. In both cases, the spheres of competence combine knowledge and practical 
skills. 
When we speak of such moral spheres, different levels of discretion can be 
achieved and result in handling of situations by undertaking moral acts and making 
moral decisions with differentiated levels of complexity and differentiated burden 
of responsibility. Senior executive engineers who exhibit a high level of integrity 
are usually given more discretion in their daily duties which require much higher 
level of expertise and responsibility than those of newly hired novices or practition-
ers. 
4. The role of discretion for engineering profession 
For many decades there was the intention that professional ethics would offer pro-
tection of the public and private spheres from professional negligence or miscon-
duct, committed both by engineers, managers, professionals in general and the rank 
and file. Engineering ethics attempted to protect the public health and welfare from 
the possible adverse effects of technologies and external harmful effects resulting 
                                                          
24 Ibidem, pp. 67–68. 
25 T. Aquinas, Summa…, Ia IIae, q. 89, a. 6; Suppl. q. 6, a. 3; Suppl. q. 39, a. 2; Suppl. q. 58, a. 5; cf. 
T. Aquinas, Of God and His Creatures, transl. by Joseph Rickaby, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 
Burns & Oates, Grand Rapids, MI, London 1905, p. 284. 
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from them. This discipline underlined the importance of sensitivity to risk, environ-
mental protection, social influences of technologies and commitment to the public 
good. 
Various codes of engineering ethics addressed such a general professional ori-
entation, which some authors call preventive ethic.26 This orientation has been di-
rected to professional individuals and was explicitly communicated mainly in the 
form of rules to be observed. There has also been another orientation present in 
professional ethics, called aspirational ethics, which advanced the use of profes-
sional knowledge to promote the human good, health and societal welfare, espe-
cially in its material dimension.27 
The third ethical orientation which has recently has become a matter of some 
concern is virtue ethics, sometimes called ‘ethics of character’. Its main goal is to 
complement the deficiencies and create opportunities which the rule-based ap-
proach in ethics was not able to overcome. Harris briefly specifies the advantages 
of virtue ethics applied to professional engineering. First, a virtue is a permanent 
disposition which manifests itself in certain categories of behavior whenever spe-
cific circumstances arise. Second, virtuous living gives satisfaction to the virtuous 
person – a genuine pleasure of being good and true to oneself. Third, knowledge of 
correct, moral decisions and the application of virtues are matters of practical wis-
dom gained over time with experience, which an immature, young person cannot 
have. Fourth, virtues are divided into intellectual and moral categories, with the 
former using such abilities as contemplation, deliberation and practical wisdom, 
while creativity and intelligence are not direct guarantees of moral acts. The latter 
however, like honesty, generosity, loyalty and trustworthiness, are personal charac-
ter traits. Fifth, this approach has recently begun to offer a virtue portrait of an ideal 
person, one who possesses the virtues needed (or at least as many as possible)28 for 
the successful practicing the profession. This virtue-based orientation of profes-
sional ethics which has recently prevailed in engineering can be found in many 
codes of engineering ethics in combination with the rule-based approach.29 
The discussion in previous paragraphs attempts to propose another orientation 
in professional ethics, which is focused on the personal perfection of a professional. 
We may call it ‘personalistic virtue ethics’ or ‘personalistic professionalism’, since 
it emphasizes the need for the personal perfection of a professional as the condition 
of moral behavior, both personal and professional. There are noteworthy advances 
in professional engineering ethics which attempt to enrich the overall ethical com-
petencies of professional engineers based on virtue ethics with emphases added on 
the necessity and use of conscience,30 however without a deeper, comprehensive 
and systematic approach. 
                                                          
26 Ch.E. Harris, Jr., The Good Engineer: Giving Virtue its Due in Engineering Ethics, “Science & Engi-
neering Ethics” 2008, Vol. 14, doi: 10.1007/s11948-008-9068-3, pp. 153–154. 
27 Ibidem. 
28 Ibidem, p. 157 
29 E.g. in the codes of professional ethics of NSPE, ASME, AICHE; cf. Ch. Fleddermann, pp. 139–151. 
30 Cf. G. Baura, Engineering Ethics: An Industrial Perspective, Academic Press, 2006. 
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As we have described earlier, the power of good action and the knowledge of 
the right act are not enough to secure the good use of the power of good habit in 
a virtuous act, especially in the face of many impediments, like fear, social pressure, 
customs, anger etc. Prudence plays here an indispensable role since through discre-
tion, conscience and command of the right reason the person can overcome the im-
pediments and act virtuously. Not only should the professional engineer be able to 
arrange for a piece of art, but also to deliberate and decide how to use it well and 
for good ends. For the latter, prudence and discretion play vital roles. 
5. Conclusion 
The Aristotelian-Thomistic ethical system provides an objective and realistic cate-
gorical framework with which one can achieve a stable transition from principles of 
knowledge and practical science to moral imperatives of what is good and what is 
evil, what should be done and what avoided. The stability of such an evaluation is 
carried out within productive truths in engineering, e.g. how to design a product, an 
effective circuit, a safe motorway, bridge, machine tool or set up a welfare-increas-
ing natural park. It requires the application of valid scientific knowledge of the 
physical world to particular circumstances.  
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